BENJAMIN "KOKOY" ROMUALDEZ v. OMBUDSMAN AND PCGG
G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
TOPICS: RELATION OF PRESCIPTION UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL PENAL LAWS PRESCRIPTION
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Romualdez claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 information against him for violation of Section 7 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was raised that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. The defense of prescription may be raised for the first time on appeal and thus, there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo.
The Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the information does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution. New information may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation and that the filing of the complaint with the PCGG and the filing of the information interrupted the prescriptive period. The absence of the petitioner from the Philippines also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the RPC.
ISSUES:
Whether prescription under Article 10 of the RPC applies to special penal laws specifically for violation of Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
HELD:
No, Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code will not apply to R.A. 3019 which is a special law.
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code - offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide for the contrary.
The Supreme Court stated that one may hastily conclude that a special law such as R.A. No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. However, it must be pointed out that suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matters.
In this case, Act No. 3326 which governs the computation of prescription of the offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy."
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to special laws, however, Act No. 3326 falls within the ambit of "special law" as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code.
Even if Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to R.A. No. 3019, the same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the contemporaneous application of the two laws. The RPC explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies to special laws while the RPC shall apply to special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary. Statutory construction dictate that special legal provision must prevail over general ones.
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